Sovereign debt crises and financial bailouts: the anatomy and components of an everlasting relationship (I)

Marianne Ojo

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper highlights why financial bailouts are an inevitable and necessary element in global efforts aimed at ensuring that financial stability is sustained. How could such bailouts be conducted in such a way that moral hazard does not become a too frequent, ever recurring issue? Systemic risks constitute a crucial reason for the need to avoid global instability. Adequately and promptly responding to “too big to fail” institutions and nations also constitutes a crucial component of the need to avoid and contain the spread of systemic risks.

Keywords: systemic risks; financial regulation; sovereign debts; bailouts; moral hazard; supervision; monetary; fiscal policies; IMF; monetary unions; regional unions; ECB (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 E5 E6 G01 K2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-mac
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:39194

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