Social diversification, injustices, and Pareto optimality with non-binary preferences

Arian Berdellima and Nadeem Naqvi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We prove the existence of a Pareto optimal state of a finite society that has socially differentiated persons, each with non-binary personal preferences that quasi-order a finite set of alternatives. Everybody engages in a volitional act of choice by maximization of non-binary preferences. As a consequence of interpersonal interaction among social creatures, the social interaction outcome defined as belonging to a nonempty social maximal set exists, and thus is Pareto optimal. Injustices inflicted by one group of persons upon a socially distinct one, arising from social diversification, are, however, consistent with such a collective outcome. (95 words)

Keywords: non-binary choice; maximization; Pareto optimality; social identity; justice; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D13 D63 D74 J15 J16 J71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Working Paper: Social diversification, injustices, and Pareto optimality with non-binary preferences (2012)
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