Globalization and protection of employment

Justina A. V. Fischer and Frank Somogyi ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Unionists and politicians frequently claim that globalization lowers employment protection of workers. This paper tests this hypothesis in a panel of 28 OECD countries from 1985 to 2003, differentiating between three dimensions of globalization and two labor market segments. While overall globalization is shown to loosen protection of the regularly employed, it increases regulation in the segment of limited-term contracts. We find economic and political globalization to drive deregulation for the regularly employed, while political and social integration appear responsible for the better protection of workers in atypical employment, outweighing the negative effect of economic integration. We offer political economy arguments as explanations for these differential effects on labor market legislation.

Keywords: Globalization; International trade; Employment protection; Labor standards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C33 F15 F16 J63 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Globalization and Protection of Employment (2012)
Working Paper: Globalization and Protection of Employment (2009)
Working Paper: Globalization and Protection of Employment (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:39426

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