Assessing the Impact of Deterrence on Road Safety due to the Demerit Point System

Vincent Chandler ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of a decrease in demerit points on the probability of traffic violation. To address the inherent heterogeneity of drivers, I use the expiration process of points to compare the behaviour of similar drivers with different demerit points. I find that a 3-point decrease in the number of demerit points only has an impact for drivers close to the limit, but increases their probability of violation by 50 to 80 percent.

Keywords: Demerit point system; deterrence; driving; road safety; traffic violation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 K32 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-tre
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:39439

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