Political power and aid tying practices in the development assistance committee countries

Jared Pincin

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Using a panel of 22 OECD Development Assistance Committee countries over the 1979-2009 period, this paper examines the link between donor-political institutional features, particularly the fragmentation of executive power and the degree of competition in the legislative branch of government, and the share of tied aid in the aid budget of a donor. The empirical results show tied aid, both in levels and as a percentage of total aid, increases as the number of decision makers within the governing coalition increases and decreases as the proportion of excess seats a governing coalition holds above a simple majority increases.

Keywords: Official Development Assistance (ODA); tied aid; fragmented government; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-14
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