“Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow?” On the implications of deaccess policies on donations to museums

Luigi Di Gaetano () and Isidoro Mazza ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The recent global crisis has forced many countries to a tight fiscal discipline. As a consequence, the cultural sectors in those countries have experienced severe budget cuts. In this context, disparate suggestions for additional sources of revenue available to public institutions have emerged. In particular, deaccessioning seems able to guarantee the sustainability of public cultural institutions without serious negative impacts on the fruition of cultural goods. This paper addresses the consequences that a widespread deaccessioning would have on private bequests to public institutions. We develop a sequential game with incomplete information between a Museum and a Donor. There are two types of museums: one type is committed not to sale its collection; the second type has no restriction on selling a share of its art endowment. The Donor does not know the type of Museum. The non-committed Museum can sale items in the first stage and/or in the third stage. Donors contribute only in the second stage. Therefore, deaccessioning triggers a moral hazard problem. We derive a number or results concerning the allocation of gifts and the decision of deaccessioning and provide numerical simulations to interpret the parameters. Most notably, with respect to a benchmark case where deaccessioning is illegal, contributions are reduced when the non-committed Museum deaccesses in the first stage (separating strategy). If, however, that Museum does not deaccess at the beginning (pooling strategy), also the committed Museum receives less than in the benchmark case. Interestingly, an increase of public grants to Museums (of any type) allows the non-committed Museum to adopt a pooling strategy, causing a reduction of donations to the committed Museum. This result provides an intuition for the widespread resistance of museum directors to deaccessioning and for their efforts to enforce common and strict guidelines.

Keywords: Deaccessioning; Museums financing policy; sequential game; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 Z10 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-cul
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Related works:
Journal Article: “Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow” on the implications of deaccess policies for donations to museums (2017)
Working Paper: Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow: On the implications of deaccess policies on donations to museums (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:39611

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