EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

On the Welfare Effects of Exclusive Distribution Arrangements

Jürgen Eichberger and Frank Mueller-Langer ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The regulation of vertical relationships between firms is the subject of persistent legal and academic controversy. The literature studying vertical trade relationships seems to assume that an upstream monopolist prefers downstream competition over exclusive distribution arrangements. We derive precise conditions for when an upstream monopolist prefers competing distribution systems over exclusive distribution in the downstream market. We also show that the welfare effects of downstream competition are ambiguous. A downstream oligopoly may have negative welfare properties compared to a downstream monopoly.

Keywords: Exclusive distribution; Competing distribution; Vertical foreclosure; Cournot competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 L42 D4 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39691/1/MPRA_paper_39691.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:39691

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2020-07-03
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:39691