Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game?

David Amdur and Schmick Ethan

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We compare the strategy and direct-response methods in a one-shot trust game with hidden action. In our experiment, the decision elicitation method affects neither participants' behavior nor their beliefs about this behavior. We conclude that the direct-response method does not, by itself, induce guilt aversion.

Keywords: Trust; guilt aversion; strategy method; direct-response method; behavioral economics; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40148/1/MPRA_paper_40148.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40157/1/MPRA_paper_40157.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Does the direct-response method induce guilt aversion in a trust game? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40148

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