一般化Moran过程中的合作演化

The Evolution of Cooperation in a Generalized Moran Process

Darong Dai

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game as a benchmark being used to build a new model as the payoff matrix of an evolutionary game dynamics, with the comparative study of game performances between the behavior- pattern “tit for tat” and the behavior-pattern “always defection”, proving that there exists a strictly positive probability, which has a close link with the discount factor, that a single TFT individual can fully invade into a group of ALLD individuals; that is to say, TFT has some kind of evolutionary stability.

Keywords: IPD; Evolutionary Game Dynamics; Equilibrium Selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-07-01
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