On the existence and stability of Pareto optimal endogenous matching with fairness

Darong Dai

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of populations by employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game equilibrium of a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is derived by introducing optimal-stopping technique into evolutionary game theory, which combines with the Pareto optimal standard leads us to the existence of Pareto optimal endogenous matching. Moreover, stability of the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed by essentially using the well-known Girsanov Theorem.

Keywords: Stochastic differential cooperative game on time; Pareto optimal endogenous matching; Stable matching; Fairness; Induced game equilibrium; Stochastic replicator dynamics; Adaptive learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C70 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-15
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