Evolution of mindsight, transparency and rule-rationality

Dimitry Rtischev

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Evolution of preferences models often assume that all agents display and observe preferences costlessly. Instead, we endogenize mindsight (to observe preferences) and transparency (to show preferences) as slightly costly mechanisms that agents may or may not possess. Unlike in the costless models, we show that universal rule-rationality, mindsight and transparency do not constitute an equilibrium but universal act-rationality, mind-blindness, and opaqueness do. We also find that rule-rationality, mindsight, and transparency may exist in evolved populations, albeit only in a portion of the population whose size fluctuates along an orbit around a focal point. We apply our results to Ultimatum and Trust games to explore how costly and optional mindsight may affect economic performance in interactions among evolved agents.

Keywords: evolution of preferences; act-rationality; rule-rationality; ultimatum game; trust game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D83 D87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolution of Mindsight and Psychological Commitment among Strategically Interacting Agents (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40890

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