Second-price Auction with Two-Dimensional Private Information on Values and Participation Costs

Xiaoyong Cao and Guoqiang Tian

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when values and participation costs are both privation information and are drawn from general distribution functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It is shown that there always exists an equilibrium for this general economy, and further there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium when all bidders are ex ante homogenous. Moreover, we identify a sufficient condition under which we have a unique equilibrium in a heterogenous economy with two bidders. Our general framework covers many relevant models in the literature as special cases.

Keywords: Two-Dimensional types; Private Values; Private Participation Costs; Second Price Auctions; Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D44 D61 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58038/1/MPRA_paper_58038.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:41224

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