Implementing Lindahl Allocations by a Withholding Mechanism

Guoqiang Tian

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates the problem of designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations for public goods economies when initial endowments are private information and unreported endowments are consumed (withheld) but are not destroyed. It will be noted that the mechanism presented here is individually feasible, balanced, and continuous. Besides, we allow preferences of agents to be nontotal-nontransitive and discontinuous.

Keywords: Lindahl allocations; withholding mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics 2.22(1993): pp. 169-179

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Journal Article: Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism (1993)
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