A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem

Umut Dur

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Abstract This paper characterizes the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem. Schools may have multiple available seats to be assigned to students. For each school a strict priority ordering of students is determined by the school district. Each student has strict preference over the schools. We first define weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. We show that the top trading cycles mechanism is the unique Pareto efficient and strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies the weaker forms of fairness, consistency and resource monotonicity. To our knowledge this is the first axiomatic approach to the top trading cycles mechanism in the school choice problem where schools have a capacity greater than one.

Keywords: Top Trading Cycles Mechanism; School Choice Problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth, nep-lab and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Journal Article: A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem (2024)
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