Social Consequences of Commitment

Alan Isaac

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper begins with a detailed computational introduction to a classic ACE model: an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma. The paper presents a simple but fully coded object oriented implementation of this model. (We use the Python programming language, which is shown to be a natural ally for ACE research). Using these tools, we demonstrate that player type evolution is affected by cardinal payoffs. We then explore a possible social benefit to commitment, where 'commitment' denotes an unwillingness to surrender a reciprocal strategy.

Keywords: ACE; agent-based; computational economics; iterated prisoner's dilemma; evolutionary prisoner's dilemma; commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-10-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cmp, nep-evo and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:414

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