Delegation to potentially uninformed agent

Aggey Semenov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a delegation problem with a potentially uninformed agent when the principal cannot use monetary payments. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large, then the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias is small or medium however, the optimal delegation set is no longer connected. It can be one of two types: with an interval and low option, the other with two intervals. In all cases the agent has less discretion. However, in the case of medium biases the principal delegates in a wider range than in the case of informed agent. In all cases the agent will be given more freedom if he is more informed.

Keywords: Delegation; non-informed agent; delegation set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:42080

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