Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count: what do wealth-effects tell us in Africa?

Simplice Asongu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Why are some nations more effective at battling corruption than others? Are there different determinants in the fight against corruption across developing nations? How do wealth effects play-out when existing corruption-control levels matter in the corruption battle? To investigate these concerns we examine the determinants of corruption-control throughout the conditional distribution of the fight against corruption. The following broad findings are established. (1) Population growth is a (an) tool (impediment) in (to) the fight against corruption in Low (Middle) income countries. (2) Democracy increases (decreases) corruption-control in Middle (Low) income countries. As a policy implication, blanket corruption-control strategies are unlikely to succeed equally across countries with different income-levels and political wills in the fight against corruption. Thus to be effective, corruption policies should be contingent on the prevailing levels of corruption-control and income-bracket.

Keywords: Corruption; Democracy; Government quality; Quantile regression; Africa (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 H10 K10 O10 O55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-dev, nep-law and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Fighting Corruption when Existing Corruption-Control Levels Count: What do Wealth-Effects Tell us in Africa? (2013)
Working Paper: Fighting corruption when existing corruption-control levels count: what do wealth-effects tell us in Africa? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:42180

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