The Failure of Decoupling Liability and Other Mistakes in Tort Law
Enrico Baffi ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
In this paper I want to demonstrate that it is not possible, with traditional liability rules, to have one party that takes an efficient level of precaution. Both parties, whaever is the rule, take an excessive level of precaution. The problem is that, when we try to calculate the costs of an activity, we dconsider also the cost of precaution of the other party, but this is not usually done. Also the introduction of a tax (the solution called as "decoupling liability") does not solve the problem because the party who pays the tax does not consider the cost of precaution of the other party. This way of reasoning is instead wrog in unilateral accident where a party does not take precautions. In this case an efficient level of activity is reached. Due to these considerations some traditional conclusions about tort liabiity should be reconsidered
Keywords: The ineffciency of decoupling liability; the impossibility of a have a party to take an efficient level of precaution; some problems with Shavell Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H20 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:42242
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