The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection

Dritan Osmani and Richard Tol

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Abstract Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of d'Aspremont et al. (1983) frequently use the assumption that countries can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs. Extending a model of Barrett (1994a) on a single self-enforcing IEA, we demonstrate that there are many similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental equality

Keywords: Keywords: self-enforcing international environmental agreements; non-cooperative game the- ory; stability; nonlinear optimization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05-31
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:4256

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