Practically Implementable Auction for a Good with Countervailing Positive Externalities

Kornpob Bhirombhakdi () and Tanapong Potipiti

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study theoretically presents a new auction design called "take-or-give auction." The auction solves the free-rider problem in the case of two symmetric and risk-neutral bidders competing for a good with countervailing positive externalities. The auction makes efficient allocation. Moreover, the extension of the auction by addition some rules maximizes the seller's expected revenue.

Keywords: Auction design; positive externalities; countervailing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43609/1/MPRA_paper_43609.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:42911

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