Special Interest Politics and Intellectual Property Rights: An Economic Analysis of Strengthening Patent Protection in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Angus Chu ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Since the 80’s, the pharmaceutical industry has benefited substantially from a series of policy changes that have strengthened the patent protection for brand-name drugs as a result of the industry’s political influence. This paper incorporates special interest politics into a quality-ladder model to analyze the policymakers’ tradeoff between the socially optimal patent length and campaign contributions. The welfare analysis suggests that the presence of a pharmaceutical lobby distorting patent protection is socially undesirable in a closed-economy setting but may improve social welfare in a multi-country setting, which features an additional efficiency tradeoff between monopolistic distortion and international free-riding on innovations.
Keywords: campaign contributions; intellectual property rights; patent length; special interest politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O34 D72 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-pol
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4349/1/MPRA_paper_4349.pdf original version (application/pdf)
Journal Article: SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF STRENGTHENING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:4349
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