Coopetitive game solutions for the Greek crisis

Daniele Schiliro' and David Carfì ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper proposes a model of coopetitive-game (of normal-form type) and devote it to Greek crisis, conceiving this model at a macro level, with the aim of rebalancing the current account of Greece. The authors construct the game trying to represent feasible scenarios of the strategic interaction between Greece and Germany. They suggest - after a deep study of their sample - feasible transferable utility solutions, in a properly coopetitive perspective, for the divergent interests of Greece and Germany.

Keywords: Coopetition; Greek crisis; current account rebalancing; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C78 F41 F42 O52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-opm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43578/1/MPRA_paper_43578.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54765/3/MPRA_paper_54765.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:43578

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().