A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley rule
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents' utilities. In this paper, a simple non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement.
Keywords: ordinal bargaining; ordinal Shapley rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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