Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

Sergey Popov

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: I propose a bribery model with decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy's productivity due to suppression of small businesses, and reduces the total graft even though it might increase the individual bribe amount. The coordinated deviation to a better participation equilibrium is impossible due to decentralization. Anti-corruption efforts, even temporary, might be useful if they invite better participation.

Keywords: corruption; bribery; decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-26, Revised 2013-01-16
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Journal Article: Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation (2015)
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