Interlocking directorates as a thrust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry

Davide Carbonai () and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates the market structure of the insurance business by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created by their directors. We focus on the non-life business since this is a sector relatively closed with respect to the competition with other financial activities; an absence of industry competition cannot thus be compensated by other agents. We apply the graph theory to describe the network and the principal component analysis to summarize information and verify the correlation between direct interlocking and companies’ market shares.

Keywords: Non-life insurance; antitrust; competition; interlocking directorates; network economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K0 K21 K23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ias, nep-law and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Interlocking directorates as a trust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry (2006)
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