Three's company: Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street

Deniz Igan and Prachi Mishra

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper explores the link between the political influence of the financial industry and financial regulation in the run-up to the global financial crisis. We construct a detailed database documenting the lobbying activities, campaign contributions, and political connections of the financial industry from 1999 to 2006 in the United States. We find evidence that spending on lobbying by the financial industry and network connections between lobbyists and the legislators were positively linked to the probability of a legislator changing positions in favor of deregulation. The evidence also suggests that hiring connected lobbyists who had worked for legislators in the past enhanced this link.

Keywords: Lobbying; PAC; Financial Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11, Revised 2012-08
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:44220

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