Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach

Athanasios Papakonstantinou () and Peter Bogetoft

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article addresses two important issues in crowd-sourcing: ex ante uncertainty about the quality and cost of different workers and strategic behaviour. We present a novel multi-dimensional auction that incentivises the workers to make partial enquiry into the task and to honestly report quality-cost estimates based on which the crowd-sourcer can choose the worker that offers the best value for money. The mechanism extends second score auction design to settings where the quality is uncertain and it provides incentives to both collect information and deliver desired qualities.

Keywords: crowd-sourcing; Multi-dimensional auctions; Yardstick competition; Score functions; Strictly proper scoring rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 D84 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44236/3/MPRA_paper_44236.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:44236

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