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Existence of Nash Equilibrium in games with a measure space of players and discontinuous payoff functions

Guilherme Carmona and Konrad Podczeck

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Balder's (2002) model of games with a measure space of players is integrated with the line of research on finite-player games with discontinuous payoff functions which follows Reny (1999). Specifically, we extend the notion of continuous security, introduced by McLennan, Monteiro and Tourky (2011) and Barelli and Meneghel (2012) for finite-players games, to games with a measure space of players and establish the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for such games. A specification of our main existence result is provided which is ready to fit the needs of applications. As an illustration, we consider several optimal income tax problems in the spirit of Mirrlees (1971) and use our game-theoretic result to show the existence of an optimal income tax in each of these problems.

Keywords: Existence of equilibrium; measure space of players; discontinuities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Existence of Nash equilibrium in games with a measure space of players and discontinuous payoff functions (2014) Downloads
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