L’evoluzione dei patti sociali in una prospettiva analitica
The evolution of social pacts: An analytical perspective
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
Stefano Papa ()
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this paper we revisit the case for corporatist agreements in a model where labor markets are unionized, the government controls the fiscal stance, and an independent central bank sets monetary policy. We can then analyze the scope for a political exchange between public expenditure and wage setting choices, showing that corporatism may generate quite different macroeconomic outcomes from the traditional exchange between wage restraint and high public expenditure. In fact our model can easily encompass both first and second-generation corporatist agreements.
Keywords: Corporatism; trade unions; fiscal policy; monetary conservativeness; policy game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J08 H23 J58 H20 H11 J5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:4436
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