Riesgo moral asociado al uso de endeudamiento externo de corto plazo por parte del sector financiero

Moral Hazard associated with the use of short-term foreign borrowing by the financial intermediaries in Costa Rica

Jorge Leon and Carlos Monge

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of moral hazard associated with the use of short-term foreign borrowing by the financial intermediaries in Costa Rica. This situation arises from the implicit insurance that the authorities confer; given the expectation that banks have about central bank incentives to intervene to prevent the fail of any systemically important financial institution (SIFI). Using a simple mathematical-economic model, this paper analyzes several factors involved in this phenomenon and suggests policy measures that could provide a solution to the problem.

Keywords: moral hazard; borrowing; sistemic risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010, Revised 2010
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