Riesgo moral asociado al uso de endeudamiento externo de corto plazo por parte del sector financiero
Moral Hazard associated with the use of short-term foreign borrowing by the financial intermediaries in Costa Rica
Jorge Leon and
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
This paper addresses the issue of moral hazard associated with the use of short-term foreign borrowing by the financial intermediaries in Costa Rica. This situation arises from the implicit insurance that the authorities confer; given the expectation that banks have about central bank incentives to intervene to prevent the fail of any systemically important financial institution (SIFI). Using a simple mathematical-economic model, this paper analyzes several factors involved in this phenomenon and suggests policy measures that could provide a solution to the problem.
Keywords: moral hazard; borrowing; sistemic risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010, Revised 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:44486
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