The problem of the principal-agent and promotion tournaments in religious organizations: choosing the next pope

Livio Oliveira and Giácomo Balbinotto Neto

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper shows an application of Promotion Tournaments to religious organizations, which is appropriate, especially in the case of highly ranked institutions such as the Catholic Church. With this objective, we seek to verify the suitability of the use Tournaments in religious organizations, regarding the optimal structure of contracts in order to select, as well as, to promote clerics. Two models are addressed, modified from the originals, through the inclusion of psychic income, both with two clerics with homogeneous skills. Finally, we discuss the advantages and limitations of the Tournaments applied to religious organizations, including its risks and distortions therein.

Keywords: Religious Organizations; Catholic Church; Tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02-14
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44610/1/MPRA_paper_44609.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44679/1/MPRA_paper_44679.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:44610

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