Condorcet winners on median spaces

Berno Buechel
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Berno Büchel

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We characterize the outcome of majority voting for single--peaked preferences on median spaces. This large class of preferences covers a variety of multi--dimensional policy spaces including products of lines (e.g.\ grids), trees, and hypercubes. Our main result is the following: If a Condorcet winner (i.e.\ a winner in pairwise majority voting) exists, then it coincides with the appropriately defined median (``the median voter''). This result generalizes previous findings which are either restricted to a one--dimensional policy space or to the assumption that any two voters with the same preference peak must have identical preferences. The result applies to models of spatial competition between two political candidates. A bridge to the graph--theoretic literature is built.

Keywords: majority rule; median voter theorem; Condorcet winner; generalized single--peakedness; median spaces; Hotelling; Weber Point (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04-18, Revised 2013-02-27
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Condorcet winners on median spaces (2014)
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