The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations “investor – government” type

Dmytro Sokolovskyi () and Olena Sokolovska

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The article deals with problem of forming of Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing of reduction of risks of investment activity in economy. The game-theoretical analysis suggests that inefficiency of arising norms is non-casual; it follows from the behavior of interactive parties. Empirical verification based on statistical data of OECD countries confirms in general the established conclusion.

Keywords: investors, government, economic behavior; game theory, Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 E22 H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02
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