Ordinal equivalence of values and Pigou-Dalton transfers in TU-games

Célestin Nembua () and Themoi Demsou

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The paper studies the ordinal equivalence of Linear, Efficient and Symmetry (LES) values in TU-games. It demonstrates that most of the results obtained by Carreras F, Freixas J (2008) in the case of semivalues and simple games are transposable on LES values and the whole TU-games set. In particular, linear and weakly linear games are analyzed. We characterize both values which are ordinal equivalent in all TU-games. Pigou-Dalton transfers are introduced for social comparison of values and to shed light on the way payoffs are redistributed from a value to another.

Keywords: Cooperative games; desirability relation; linear values; linear games; Pigou-Dalton transfers; concentration, Lorenz dominance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03-09, Revised 2013-03-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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