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La atribución de responsabilidades políticas en Estados descentralizados

The atribution of political responsibilities in decentralized countries

Santiago Lago-Peñas and Ignacio Lago ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This article examines the institutional and individual determinants of the correct allocation of political responsibilities in a decentralized country such as Spain. It also deals with the learning process of individuals over time. Our results show that the allocation of powers is more successful when they are exclusively in the hands of the central government and in the so-called "fast track" regions. Moreover, empirical evidence confirms the existence of a learning process. Finally, we show that the impact of individual determinants, such as age or educational level, depends on the policy being studied.

Keywords: Decentralization; Spain; regional powers; expenditure decentralization; federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: R5 Z18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-02-28
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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