Spatial Pillage Game

Hanjoon Jung ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A pillage game is a coalitional game that is meant to be a model of Hobbesian anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage game by assuming that players are located in regions. Players can travel from one region to another in one move and can form a coalition and combine their power only with players in the same region. A coalition has power only within its region. Under this spatial restriction, some members of a coalition can pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages between coalitions determines the dominance relation. Core, stable set, and farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.

Keywords: allocation by force; coalitional games; pillage game; spatial restriction; stable set; farsighted core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 R19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-geo and nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4651/1/MPRA_paper_4651.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6022/1/MPRA_paper_6022.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Spatial pillage game (2009)
Working Paper: Spatial Pillage Game (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:4651

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