On pure strategy equilibria in large generalized games

Alvaro Riascos () and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We consider a game with a continuum of players where at most a finite number of them are atomic. Objective functions are continuous and admissible strategies may depend on the actions chosen by atomic players and on aggregate information about the actions chosen by non-atomic players. When atomic players have convex sets of admissible strategies and quasi-concave objective functions, a pure strategy Nash equilibria always exists.

Keywords: Generalized games; Non-convexities; Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-mkt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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