Исследование равновесий налоговой конкуренции в условиях монополистической конкуренции налогоплательщиков

Tax competition equilibria analysis under taxpayers' monopolistic competition

Georgiy Kolesnik and Natalia Leonova

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The effect of taxpyers' competition at jurisdictions' local markets on the properties of the tax competition equilibrium is studied. The general equilibrium model is considered with mobile firms acting under monopolistic competition on local markets. It is shown that equilibrium tax rate tends to grow when the conditions of the firms' functioning are worsening because of any reason. The peculiar effect is multiple equilibria appearance if the profit of the firms is not monotonic function of their quantity.

Keywords: taxation; tax competition; race to the bottom; multi-level competition; hierarchical system; extensive form game; subgame-perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H25 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Вестник Тверского государственного университета. Прикладная математика 34 (2011): pp. 111-125

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47314/1/MPRA_paper_47314.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:47314

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().