Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection?
Marc Bellemare and
Nicholas Carnes
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
It seems paradoxical that developed countries continue subsidizing agriculture even though their agricultural sectors have been declining in relative importance since the middle of the 20th century. What drives support for agricultural protection in developed countries? We answer this question by testing three competing hypotheses about what drives support for agricultural protection in the US: (i) legislator preferences, (ii) electoral incentives, or (iii) lobbying. Using data on the roll call votes of the members of the 106th through the 110th Congresses (1999-2009) and the scores given to each legislator by the Farm Bureau, our findings suggest electoral incentives explain a great deal of the variation in support for agricultural protection, but that legislator preferences and lobbying play a role, too. Moreover, legislator preferences and electoral incentives appear to be substitutes for one another. Why does Congress support agricultural protection? Because many members have electoral incentives to—and because many of those who do not still have other personal or strategic interests at stake.
Keywords: Agricultural Policy; Agricultural Protection; Farm Bill; Congress; Voting; Lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 Q18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Why do members of congress support agricultural protection? (2015) 
Working Paper: Why Do Members of Congress Support Agricultural Protection? (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:47629
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