Конкуренция саморегулируемых организаций и эффективность рынков

Self-regulatory organizations competition and the market efficiency

Mikhail Bendikov and Georgiy Kolesnik

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The effect of competition among self-regulatory organizations (SRO) on the efficiency of the corresponding goods and services markets is considered. It is shown that under certain conditions the competition among SRO worsens the quality of the goods and services and leads to decrease in consumers’ welfare. Moreover, the distinctive feature of the competition among SRO in comparison with other types of regulator competition is that even introduction of alternative government control does not improve the situation. The proposals are formulated for self-regulatory markets’ structure and conditions change in order to reduce negative effects of SRO competition.

Keywords: self-regulation; state control; market; regulatory competition; welfare; mathematical model; hierarchical system; non-cooperative game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L22 L44 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-com
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:47812

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