Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique

Strategic Bankruptcy with accountable and judicial risks

Bertrand Chopard and Eric Langlais

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the influence of bankruptcy law (depending on whether the law is pro-lenders or pro-borrowers) on the borrowers propensity to demand the renegotiation of their debt, when there exist an asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers. In the tradition of Law & Economics, we proceed to a study of impact for the main parameters of the model that capture the design of bankruptcy law, showing their influence on the probability of strategic bankruptcy and on the social welfare.

Keywords: bankruptcy law; strategic debt repudiation; judicial risk and debt renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G0 G20 G21 G29 K0 K2 K35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-07-09
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