EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Reti di trasporto nazionale e concorrenza nei mercati del gas: il caso Eni-Snam Rete Gas

Networks and competition in natural gas markets: the case of Eni-Snam Rete Gas

Federico Testa and Carlo Stagnaro

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In transposing EU Directive 73/2009/CE on natural gas infrastructures into Italy’s national legislation, the country opted for a Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) model instead of full ownership unbundling. ITO allows the essential facility to be controlled by a vertically integrated incumbent who is also in charge of choosing the company’s directors, even though within a strictly regulated context. Regulation applies both to the use of the infrastructure itself and information flow to and from it. This paper explores the costs and benefits of ownership unbundling in the light of the literature. The Italian case is studied by developing a simple econometric model that compares the investment policy of Snam Rete Gas – i.e. the operator of Italy’s natural gas transportation network, which is controlled by the former monopolist Eni - with that of Terna, operator of the electricity transmission grid, which has been unbundled from the formerly-vertically integrated incumbent since 2004.

Keywords: competition; natural gas; regulation; ownership unbundling; essential facility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 L13 L43 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Sinergie 86 (2011): pp. 187-203

Downloads: (external link)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48698/1/MPRA_paper_48698.pdf original version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:48698

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joachim Winter ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48698