Eficacia y asimetrías de los programas de delación en un contexto multi-mercado: un análisis del caso colombiano en el marco del TLC con Estados Unidos

Efficacy and asymmetries of the leniency programs on a multi-market context: an analysis of the Colombian case under the FTA with the U.S

Dennis Sánchez Navarro

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes the possible effects of asymmetries in the leniency programs on anti-competitive behavior of agents in multi-market context. In particular, this paper analyzes the Colombian leniency program and compares it with the United States program to identify possible differences between them that could affect the effectiveness of the leniency policy. El presente documento busca analizar los posibles efectos de las asimetrías en los programas de delación en diversas jurisdicciones territoriales sobre el comportamiento anticompetitivo de los agentes en un contexto multi-mercado. En particular, este trabajo analiza el programa de delación de Colombia y lo contrasta con el de Estados Unidos para identificar posibles diferencias entre ellos que pudieran incidir en la efectividad de la política de delación.

Keywords: D29; D43; D79. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D29 D43 D79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-25
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