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Dynamic game model of endogenous growth with consumption externalities

Katsuhiko Hori and Akihisa Shibata
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: 堀 勝彦 ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper introduces consumption externalities into an endogenous growth model of common capital accumulation and characterizes balanced growth equilibria. Contrary to the standard argument in previous studies, we show that the growth rate in a feedback Nash equilibrium can be higher than that in an open-loop Nash equilibrium if agents strongly admire the consumption of others. This result is irrelevant to whether preferences exhibit "keeping up with the Joneses" or "running away from the Joneses".

Keywords: Differential game; Consumption externalities; Endogenous growth; Open-loop Nash equilibrium; Feedback Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 H23 O44 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-29
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications 1.145(2010): pp. 93-107

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49314/1/MPRA_paper_49314.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49331/1/MPRA_paper_49314.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic Game Model of Endogenous Growth with Consumption Externalities (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: A Dynamic Game Model of Endogenous Growth with Consumption Externalities (2008) Downloads
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