Language, Meaning, and Games: Comment

Yuval Heller

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Demichelis and Weibull (2008 AER) show that adding lexicographic lying costs to coordination games with cheap talk yields a sharp prediction: only the efficient outcome is evolutionarily stable. I demonstrate that this result is caused by the discontinuity of preferences, rather than by small lying costs per se.

Keywords: Lexicographic preferences; evolutionary stability; cheap talk. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-neu
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