The Political Economy of Trade-Financial Liberalization and Financial Underdevelopment: A perspective from China
Horatio M. Morgan
MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany
Abstract:
Although financial development may facilitate economic growth over the long term, financial underdevelopment remains a salient feature of even leading emerging or transition economies. In principle, openness to both international trade and finance may weaken resistance to major financial reforms; however, the apparent failure to consolidate political support for such reforms in practice is not completely understood. This paper develops a simple model of the political economy of trade-financial liberalization that offers insights into this phenomenon. When applied to China, it not only facilitates a better understanding of its approach to financial integration in the global economy and why its relatively fragile state-bank dominated financial system has persisted; but more generally, it raises the question of whether limited de facto political competition in the domestic electoral system may be a binding constraint on the quantity and quality of the policies required to foster financial development.
Keywords: China; Economic Growth; Financial Openness; Financial Development; Political Economy; Trade Openness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F36 G15 O15 O24 O43 P2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05-28
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:50031
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