Neighbourhood effects and social behaviour: the case of irrigated and rainfed farmeres in Bohol, the Philippines

Takuji Tsusaka, Kei Kajisa, Valerien Pede () and Keitaro Aoyagi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Artefactual field experiments, spatial econometrics, and household survey are blended in a single study to investigate how the experience of collective irrigation management in the real world facilitates the spillover of social behaviour among neighbours. The dictator and public goods games are conducted among irrigated and non-irrigated rice farmers in the Philippines. The spillover effect is found only among irrigated farmers. In the public goods game, punishment through social disapproval reduces free-riding more effectively among irrigated farmers. These indicate that strengthened ties among neighbours are likely to induce the spillover of social norms together with an effective punishment mechanism.

Keywords: behavioural games; artefactual field experiments; spatial econometrics; dictator game; public goods game; irrigation; social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C59 D01 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07-19
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Related works:
Working Paper: Neighbourhood effects and social behaviour: the case of irrigated and rainfed farmeres in Bohol, the Philippines (2013)
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