Innovation and Imitation with and without Intellectual Property Rights

Rufus Pollock ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: An extensive empirical literature indicates that returns from innovation are appropriated primarily via mechanisms other than formal intellectual property rights -- and that `imitation' is itself a costly activity. However most theory assumes the pure nonrivalry of `ideas' with its implication that, in the absence of intellectual property, innovation (and welfare) is zero. This paper introduces a formal model of innovation based on imperfect competition in which imitation is costly and an innovator has a first-mover advantage. Without intellectual property, a significant amount of innovation still occurs and welfare may actually be higher than with intellectual property.

Keywords: Innovation; Imperfect Competition; Intellectual Property; Imitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K3 L5 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-09, Revised 2007-07-17
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-law, nep-mic and nep-tid
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:5025

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