Democracia y transparencia en la aprobación presupuestaria mexicana

Democracy and Transparency in the Mexican public budget approval process

Laura Sour

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to fill the academic gap regarding the actors and determinants in the approval process of the public budget in Mexico. The research question deals with the analysis of the impact of the partisan and budgetary variables during the budget approval process. This paper shows in detail the agenda power of the Commission of Budget and Public Account (Comisión de Presupuesto y Cuenta Pública) has during the budgetary approval within the House of Representatives. Using a panel econometric analysis it is shown that the greater political openness associated with the democratization process, generated incentives so that the parties increased their legislative activism, and thus stopped the reign of the budgetary dictator in Mexico, although the constitutional framework has not changed.

Keywords: public budget; transparency; accountability; divided government; presidencialism; political economy; Mexico (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H60 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Published in Perfiles Latinoamericanos 30 (2007): pp. 123-151

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