Social welfare and social choice in different individuals’ preferences

Dr Haradhan Mohajan ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper discusses both social welfare and social choice using Arrow’s impossibility theorem for multi-profile preference case and two versions of it for single-profile preference case. Between these two versions first one assumes a two-individual society and the second one, which is similar to a theorem of Pollak, assuming two or more individuals. In single-profile version decisiveness, simple and complex diversity must occur. This paper considers a special case of Arrow’s theorem, namely single-profile preference. Diversity and decisiveness of preferences are discussed for two individuals and more than two individuals in a society.

Keywords: Single-profile preference; Social welfare; Pollak diversity; Dictator. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-24, Revised 2011-06-19
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Published in International Journal of Human Development and Sustainability 1.5(2012): pp. 11-22

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:50851

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